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Abstraa
This paper analyses money market integration in Europe over the period March 1979-August 1992. We
estimate the size and variability of inean (absolute) deviations from covered nominal interest parity (CIP),
ex post uncovered nominal interest parity (UIP) and ex post real interest parity (RIP) of ten European
countries vis-à-vis Germany to assess the degree of money market integration in Europe. Subsequently,
we estimate a time trend in absolute deviations ftom above interest pazity conditions to assess the speed
of money market integration in Europe. The paper ends with a unique trade-off between the degree and
the speed of money market integration in Europe. A strong trade-off ezists between the degree and the
speed of CIP integra[ion. The trade-off between UIP and RIP integration is much weaker.
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1 Introduction
The present paper analyses money market integration in Europe since the start of the European Monetary
System (EMS) in March 1979. Although, short-term capital mobility btxwcen European countries may
seriously hinderthe process of monetary unification, thedegrce and thespeed ofmoney market integration
in Europe are seldom estimated.' Section 2 sptxifies an ascending order of thrce alternative criteria for
short-term capital mobility according to their cumulative assumptions, i.e. covered rwmittal interest pariry
(CIP), ex ante uncovered nominal interest parity (UIP)and ex ante real interest parity(RIP).2 These interest
parity cortditions measure three different types of short-term capital mobility. Subsequently, we identify
the main components inpreventing aboveinterestparityconditionstohold followingFrankel and MacArthur
(1988). In section 3, we estimate the size and variability ofinean deviations and mean absolute deviations
from C[P, ez post UIP attd ez post RIP of ten European countries vis-à-vis t .,ermany to assess the dtgree
of money market integration in Europe over the periodMarch 1979-August 1992. In section4, we estimate
atime trend in absolute deviations from above interestparity conditionsto assess thespetd ofmoney market
integration in Europe over the period March 1979-August 1992. Subsequently, section 5 documents on
the trade-off between the degree atd the spced of money market integration in Europe. Finally, section
6 concludes the paper.
2 litree alteroative criteria for short-term capital mobility
Essentially, the criteria for short-term capital mobility are ttothing more than a re-interpretation of the
familiar interest pariry cortditions.' Following Frattkel and MacArthur (1988), table 1 briefly specifies
an ascending orderof three alternative interest parity conditions according to theirctunulative assumptions.
In Lemmen and Eijffinger (1993b) we argue that these interest parity conditions measure three different
types of perfect capital mobility.
~ See Commission ofthe EuropeanCommunities (1990, pp. I60-161) fora firstassessment ofmoney market in[egntion in Europe
based upon Fnnkel (1989). Sce Frankel, Phillipa and Chinn (1993, pp. 274279) for a more recent assessment of money market
integration in Europe.
' Ofcourse, the paper is also rckvant for imerrutional portfolio management. For an investor who wants ta invest in foreign
assets, the question whether CIPand l)IP hold hasdirect inplications for Ihequestion whelheror not he shouldhedge his foreign
investment.
' The criteria for shon-term capiul mobiliry arc rclated lo the standard asset market theory ofexchange nte determination.2
Table 1- Intet~est parity conditions and tbeir cumulative asstmtptions'
1 Covered nominal interest parity (CIP)
Assumption:
.i
tr.~.~ - t~.~.t ' f, - s,
Yields:
~~.~.t-i~.~.i - -s, Í;'`
II Ex ante uncovered nominal interest parity (IJIP)
Assumptions:




~r.~.e - t~.~.t - E~(s,.~ - sr)
Itt Ex ante reat interest parity (RIP)
Assumptions:
~`-s, i~.,., - i~.~.t - l;
E, (~~.,) - J~ ~~
6,(s,., - s,) -E~(P~.~-P,) - E,(P~.~ -P~)
Yield:
E~(r~.r.~) - E .(r,.~.~)
Symbols:
`~.~~ ~ - domestic nominal nte of interest at time t on a k-period bond held between time t atal ttk
f~ - forward exchange rate at time t for the delivery of foreign currency at time ttk
s - spot exchange rate at time t (defined as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currcncy)
P - domestic price level at time t
E, (r, ,, ~) - expected domestic real rate of interest at time t on a k-period bond hekl between time t and ttk
g - conditioml expectations opentor based upon the information available at time t, i.e. E(. ~IJ
k - holding perial of the underlying debt instrutnent
~ - denotes a foreign variable
Table 1 is framed according to the terminology introduced by Fnnkel and MacArthur. All variables except the interest
rates are expressed in natural logarithms. Lower-case variables represent natural logarithms. For example, the exact
expression ot'C1P is: F;"IS,-(1 ti,,,,,)I(1 ti!,,,,). We obtain the logarithmic approximation, y.,,,-i!.,,t-P,"-s„ by
taking natural logarithms of both sides and applying tlte approximatron that In(l tx)-x for small x where s,-1n(SJ,
t',"-1n(F,"), i,,,,~ln(Iti,.,,,) and i!,,,sln(Iti!„~. In section 3 we use the exact expression of CIP:
In(1 t4.~,J-In(1 ti',.J-P,.`-5
Source: Frankel and MacArthur (1988), Fnnkel (1989), Lemtnenand Eijffinger (1993b).
The first criterion - covered nominal interest parity (CIP) - examines perfect capital mobility of type 1.
IfCIPholds the fotwardpremium (discount)[P,"-s,]eqttalsthedifferettce betweenthedomestic artd foreign
nominal interest rate [i,.,f,-i!'.,t~] at the appropriate tnaturity:
(l)3
Perfect capital mobility of type I implies a zero covered nominal interest differential or in other words
a zero country premium [i,,,~ -i!,14k -(P,"-sJ-O]. Deviations from CIP reflect barriers to theintegration
of money markets across national boundaries such as Iransaction costs, capital controls, information costs,
tax laws thatdiscriminateby country of residence, default risk and risk of future capital controls (Frankel,
1992, PP. 200-201).
The second criterion - ex ante uncovered nominal interest pariry (UIP) - examines perfect capital mobility
of type Il. UIP holds if the expected retums on comparable domestic and foreign bonds aze equal except
for currency of denomination. The expected nominal exchange rate change [E,(s,~,-sJ] equals the nominal
interest differential [i,,,,k-i!,,,k] at the appropriate maturity:
tr,r ~R - tt,t ~k - Er(Sr~t - sr) (2)
Replacement of the forward exchange rate [f; "] by the expected future spot exchange rate [E,(s,,,J] yields
UIP. This replacement is allowed if exchange rate expectations are held with certainty or if investors are
risk-neutral." Note however that certainty with respect to exchange rate expectations and risk neutraliry
are sufticient conditions not necessary conditions for UIP. There are other conditions for having a zero
risk premium, e.g. ifall exchange risk is nonsystematic risk in the world ofthe Capital Asset Pricing Model
(i.e. I3~.w,,.,~Y-O). The secotxl criterion can be framed in terms of the decomposition method of Frankel
and MacArthur (1988). Frankel and MacArthurdecompose ex ante uncovered nominal interestdifferentials
as follows:
tt.t~k-rr.t.k - E t(St~k-Sr) - [tt.t.t-[r.t.k-Ur.R-S,)] t [(i;.4-Sr)-Er(s„R-Sr)] (3)
Perfect capital mobility of type 11 implies a zero country premium and a zero exchange risk premium
[(f;'`-sJ- Er(s~.k-sr)-~].
Both the CIP and the UIP condition are used to measure the degrce of money market integration. C[P
holds if domestic and covered foreign bonds are perfect substitutes and no country premium exists. Ex
ante UIP holds ifdomestic and uncovered foreign bortds areperfect substitutesand nocountry and exchange
risk premium exist. Booth et al. (1985, p. 16) denote CIP with perfect capital mobility attd ex ante UIP
with perfect capital substitutability. We denote CIP with perfect capital mobilityof type I and ex ante UIP
with perfect capital mobility of type II. Since the absence of C1P suggests that there exist arbitrage
opportunities, CIP indeed should hold in integrated markets. Frankel (1992, p. l97) argues that CIP is
an unalloyed criterion for capital mobility in the sense of the degrce of financial market integration across
' Or in other words, the forward ezchange rate is an unbiased predictor ofthe expected future spotexchange rate (seeMacDonald
and Taylor, 1992, p. 38).4
national houndaries. The absence of UIP, however, implies the existence of a risk premium in the exchange
rate and as long as this is a fair reward for the riskthat investots have to bear with respect to the currency,
the absence of UIP does not necessarily imply a form of capital immobility.s Only, exchange risk that
is not priced hampers capital mobility across national borders. Contrary to the CIP condition, the UIP
condition can only give an indirecr indication of money market integration in Europe.
The third criterion - ex ante real interest parity (RIP) - examines perfect capital mohility of type 111 or
in other wordsperfect short-term financial and non-finartcial capital mobility (seee.g. Haldaneand Pradhan,
1992b, p. 5). IVon-financial capital mobility refers to the mobility of goods and services and the mobility
ofthe production factors labourand physiral capital (technology). Branson(1988, p. I 120)notes that perfect
goods market integration may be a sufficient condition for ex ante RIP to hold because of factor price
equalisation. Ex ante RIP means that the ezpected domestic real interest rate E,(r,.,.~ and the ezpected
foreign real interest rate E,(r~ ,,k) are equal. Substitution ofex ante relative purchasing power pazity (PPP)
[E,(s,.,-sJ-E,(Pr.k-PJ-E~(P~,k-P')l into equation (2) yields RIP:
Er(rr ,.t) - Er(rr.r.t) (4)
In fact, ex ante RIP assumes that ex ante relative PPP holds continuously. The third criterion can also
be framed in termsofthe decompositionmethod of Frankel and MacArthur. Frankel and MacArthurdecom-
pose ex ante real interest differentials as follows:
Er(rr.r.k-rr..r.k)-~tr r.k-tr.r.k-Vr.k-Sr)Jtwr.t-Sr)-Er(St.k-Sr)J}
[Er(sr,k-sr)-Er(Pr.k-Pr)tEr(Pr.t-Pr )] (5)
Perfect capital mobility of type 111 not only implies a zero country premium ancl a zero exchange risk
premium but a zero expected real exchange rate change or in other words a zero deviation from ex ante
relative PPP as well [E,(s,.k-sJ-E,(p,tt-PJfE,(p;`„-P,")-0]. The last two components in equation
(5) constitute the currency premium, because they pertain to differences in assets according to the currency
in which they are denominated (i.e. currency factors), rather than the political jurisdiction in which they
are issued (i.e. country factors). Similar to the UIP condition, the RIP condition can only give an indirect
indicationof money market integration in Europe. Money market integration is anecessary butby no means
sufficient condition for RIP, since RIP also involves non-financial markets. The next section confronts
the results for UIP and RIP with those for CIP.
` The argument assumes that CIP holds continuously.5
3 The degree of money market integration in Europe
This section estimates the size and variabiliryof inean deviations and mean absolute deviations from C1P,
ex post UIP and ex post RIP of ten European countries vis-à-vis Germany to assess the degree of money
market integration in Europe along the lines set out in Lemmen and Eijffinger (1994). We use monthly
observat ions ofthree-month domestic moneymarket interest rates, spotexchange rates vis-à-vis theDeutsche
Mark (DM), forward exchange rates vis-à-vis the DM with the same three-month maturity and constuner
price indices (CPI) (see appendix A at the end ofthe paper). Mean deviations are calculated because they
make up the profit of arbitrage to which financial agents act upon. Mean absolute deviations are ralculated
because large outliers may bias mean deviations. One eztreme observation may cause a mean deviation,
while all other observations may be (close [o) zero. Also many positive and negative deviations may lead
to a zero mean deviation. Moreover, the more vaziable mean deviations the Iarger the size ofinean absolute
deviations.
Deviations from CIP are defined as [In(1 f i,,,,)-In(1 f i!,,,,)-(1213)(P"-sJ]" 100, where i,,,t, and i',,,,
are the representative domestic and foreign money market interest rate overthe three-month holding period
expressed in percentages peryear and [(1213)(P,"-sJJ' I00 is the three-month forward premittm (discount)
vis-à-vis the Deutsche Mark (DM) expressed in percentages per year. We apply the continental definition
of the exchange rate where Germany is the foreign country. Deviations from CIP may be caused by the
lack of capital mobility oftype I and~or imperfections in the data. Similarly, deviations from ex post U1P
are defined as [In(1 fi,,,,)-In(l ti!,,t,)-(1213)(s,,,-sJ]'100 where (1213)(s,f,-sJ'100 is the realised
rate of depreciation (appreciation) vis-à-vis the DM over the three-month holding period expressed in
percentages per year. That is, we assume rational ezpectations. The forecast errors ofexchange rates have
mean zero [E(~,,,~IJ-E,(s„t)-s,tk-0]. Deviations from ez post UIP may therefore be caused by the
lack of capital mobility of type II, imperfections in the data andlor exchange rate forecast errors."
Deviations from ex post RIP are defined as {[In(lti,,,,)-(1213)(p,f,-pJ]-[In(1 fi!,t,)-(1213)
(p!„-p')]}'IW where (12i3)(p,,,-pJ~100 is the change in natural Iogarithms of domestic consumer
price indices (CPI) over the three month holding period in percentages per year. Deviations from ex post
RIP may therefore be caused by the lack of capital mobility of type III, imperfections in the data andlor
inflation rate forecast errors. The ex post exchange risk premium is defined as [(1213)(P,t'-sJ-(12~3)
(s,,,-sJ]'100. Deviations from ex post (relative) PPP aredefuted as [(1213xs,,,-sJ-(1213xp,t,-pJf(1213)
(P'.i-P')]`100 artd the ez post currency pt~nium is defined as {[(1213x~"-sJ]f(1213xs,t3-sJltl(1213)
(s,., - sJ-(12i3)(P~.3- PJ t (1213)(P~,~ -P')1}'100.
"Conseyuendy, rxchangr rate forecast errors must he added to the Jecompnsition of ex ~st UIP (see Obstfeld 1994, pp. 4-S):
~,.~-~-t~.,.~ -(s„~-s,) - li~.,.~ 4.r.i-(~,~f-s,)l ' I(J;~t s,)-Er(s~~~-s,)1 ' lE,(s,.~-s,)-(s..~-s~)1b
Subsequently, we regressed those monthly (absolute) deviations vis-à-vis Germany against a constant tetm
over the period March 1979-August 1992:
Y, - Po ~ e~
(6)
If equation (6) is estimated with ordinary least squares the coefficient ~o is simply the mean (absolute)
deviation:
p o- T r Ert Y, (7)
Table 2 reports mean (absolute)deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post RIPof ten Europeancountries
vis-à-vis Germany over the period March 1979-August 1992.' Moreover, table 2 decomposes mean
(absolute) deviations from ex post UIP and ex post RIP into their components. Deviations from ex post
UIP are decomposed into a country premium and an ex post ezchange risk premium. Deviations from
ex post RIP are decomposed into a country premium, an ex post exchange risk premium and a deviation
from ex post PPP. Each of these components should be zero for a particular type of capital mobility to
hold."
It is important to note that the error term e, in equation (6) will follow a moving average process of order
two (MA(2)) because of what is known as the over[apping samples problem (Hansen and Hodrick, 1980).
The data frequency (one month) exceeds the length of the forward contract (three months). With monthly
data, any innovation occurring in month t will affect the value of instruments maturing in months t, tt 1
and t f 2. This suggests correlation between the error ten~ns one and two months apart, but zero correlation
between error terms further apart. Consequently, to correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in
the error term e„ table 2 also reports Newey-West (t987) standard errors for So (see appendix B).
' Although table 2 calcula[es mean devia[áns vis-à-vis Gertnany, table 2 also indin:c[ly determines those deviationsbe[ween any
nvo Europeancountries. For example, ifinean deviations from ex post RIP between France and Germany and between the United
Kingdom and Germeny are known, we are abte to calcutate mean deviatáns from ex post RiP between France and the United
Kin domasfollows:ru" rFx" -r~~K rcEw rFx~ r[3ER.~ ~~urse,thisisnotpossibleformeanabsolutedeviations. g ~.~- ,i- ~.a- . a-( a-
" Nnte that with respect to mean devutions (some of) the componenLc may add up to um white in fact [hey difier fmm zero.7
Table 2- Mean (absolute) deviations from CIP, ex post CTIp and ex post RIP and their components
over the period March 1979-August 1992 (in percentages per year)~
( Ordinary Least Squares estimaàon of y ~-(i o . e r)
March I979- CIP Exchange risk UIP PPP Currency RIP
August 1992 premium premium
1 2 3-1t2 4 5-2t4 6-1t5
~t~ ~2~ ~3~ ~4~ ~S~ ~6~
Belgiwn -0.S9 (0.17)" I.53 (0.73)' 0.96 (0.77) 0.73 (0.76) 2.28 (0.37)" 1.69 (0.30)"
0.75 (0.16) 3.67 (0.58) 3.39 (0.59) 3.37 (0.62) 2.93 (0.28) 2.46 (0.20)
Denmark -0.64 (0.18)" 2.19 (0.70)" I.SS (0.73)' -0.22 (0.7I) I.97 (0.42)" 133 (0.42)"
1.13 (0.17) 4.83 (0.48) 4.81 (0.47) 4.75 (0.43) 3.I2 (0.3I) 3.10 (0.27)
France -1J4 (0.36)" 2.04 (0.70)" 0.30 (0.74) -0.17 (0.79) 1.86 (0.49)" 0.12 (0.41)
1.82 (0.36) 5.23 (0.35) 4.25 (0.48) 4.48 (0.34) 2.98 (0.36) 2.32 (0.22)
Greece" -2.33 (I.OS)' -1.07 (3.16) -3.42 (2.38) I.SS (2.31) 0.48 (1.53) -1.87 (0.93)"
5.13 (0.55) 10.27 (2.46) 8.62 (2.12) 9.39 (1.74) 7.37 (0.81) 6.20 (0.32)
Ireland -0.36 (0.12)" 2.92 (0.83)" 2.56 (0.81)" -I.84 (0.97) 1.08 (0.34)' 0.72 (0.38)
0.78 (0.09) 3.08 (0.63) 4.81 (0.63) 4.95 (0.73) 3.18 (0.32) 3.29 (0.34)
Italy -L48 (0.41)" 4.27 (0.77)" 2.80 (0.74)" -2.33 (0.81)" 1.94 (0.49)" 0.46 (0.57)
1.80 (0.38) 6.72 (0.53) 3.78 (0.43) 5.66 (0.33) 3.37 (0.34) 2.93 (0.36)
The Netherlands -0.IS (0.03)'- 0.32 (0.36) 0.15 (0.35) 0.37 (0.43) 0.69 (0.30)' 0.32 (0.31)
0.38 (0.07) 2.01 (0.28) 1.95 (0.28) 3.10 (0.26) 2.49 (0.19) 2.40 (0.19)
Pnrtugal -0.64 (0.96)" 4.31 (1.38)" -0.33 (1.66) -1.77 (1.70) 2.34 (I.00)' -2.11 (0.80)"
3.49 (0.85) 10.21 (LOl) 9.49 (0.99) 10.68 (L03) 3.84 (0.68) 5.19 (0.49)
Spain -2.03 (0.41)" 4.97 (1.56)" 2.94 (I.72) -1.70 (1.37) 3.26 (0.57)" 1.23 (0.58)'
2.33 (0.41) 10.26 (1.02) 10.20 (1.08) 9.41 (0.97) 4.40 (0.44) 3.77 (0.31)
United Kingdom -0.29 (0.10)" 2.87 (2.42) 2.37 (2.39) -1.97 (2.59) 0.90 (0.47) 0.61 (0.50)
0.62 (0.08) 14.95 (1.44) 14.80 (L42) 15.56 (L37) 3.31 (0.27) 3.29 (0.30)
n
Germany is not in the table since mean (absolute) deviations are calcula[ed vis-à-vis Germany.
Calculated over [he period September 1984-August 1992.
Ccefficient differs signiticantly from uro at rhe 95 96 level of confidence (two tailed lesQ
Ccefficient differs significantly from uro at the 99 96 level of confidence (two tailed tesQ
All mean absolute deviation are significantly different from uro at the 9996 level of confidence (one tailed tesQ.
Newey-West standard errurs uf inean (absolute) deviations are indicated in parentheses.
Source: see appendix A.
(I) Deviations from CIP
The CIP condition is the least ambiguous criterion for money market integration. Ifthe country premium
is negative (positive), the domestic interest rate is artificially low (high) relative to the DM interest rate
and capital export (import) restrictions must exist (see Commission of the European Communities, 1990,
p. 160). The degree of money market integration depends on the size of inean (absolute) country premia
(that is the constant term So). We agree with Hakkio (1992, p. 3) who argues that themarginal significance
level says nothing about the impact of country premia on money market integration. The marginal
significance level rather says something about the size of the ccefficient relative [o its standard error. If
the coefficient a„falls and the standard errorfalls more, the marginal signiticance level will rise even though
the degree of money market integration has increased. Notwithstanding the above argument, we may wish
to test for [he significance of country premia. That is, we may compare the siu and variability (based8
upon Newey-West standard errors) of those premia in a t-test statistic.
With respect to the size ofinean CIP deviations [1] - measured as the positive or negative difference from
zero in absolute value - we may list the countries in ascending order of estimated degree ofCIP integration
overtheperiodMarch I 979-August 1992as follows: Portugal, Greece (calculated overtheperiodSeptember
1984-August 1992), Spain, France, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, [reland, United Kingdom and the Netherlands.
With respect to the size of inean absolute deviations from CIP [ ~ I ~ J, we may list the countries in ascending
order of estimated degree of CIP integration as follows: Portugal, Greece (catculated over the period
September 1984-August 1992), Spain, France, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, United Kingdom and
the Netherlands. The order of estimated degree of CIP integration as measured by mean deviations and
mean absolute deviations appears to be almost equivalent. Thus, Portugal, Greece and Spain show the
lowest degree of CIP integration vis-à-vis Germany and maintained many capital controlsduring the period
March 1979-August 1992. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom show the highest degree of CIP
integration.
(2) Er post exchange risk prenua
Table 2 also reports mean (absolute) ex post exchange risk premia. With respect to the size of inean ex
post exchange riskpremia [2] - measured as the positiveor negative difference fromzero in absolute value -
we may list the countries in ascending order as follows: the Netherlands, Greece (calculated over the period
September 1984-August 1992), Belgium, France, Denmark, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
5pain. With respect to the size of inean absolute ex post exchange risk prernia [ ~2 ~], we may list the
countries in ascending order as follows: the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, France, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, Greece (calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992) and the United Kingdom. Notice
the difference between the ascending orders of [2] and [~ 2~]. Large outliers may have biased mean ex
post exchange risk premia. Only, with respect to the Netherlands an insignificant mean exchange risk
premium seems plausible due to a relative stable nominal Guilder-Deutsche Mark exchange rate.
Mean absolute country premia are smaller and less vaziable than mean absolute exchange risk premia.
German investors are only willing to hold foreign assets if they obtain compensation in the form of an
exchange risk premium. [f exchange risk is just priced risk, investors will be perfectly willing to invest
abroad since the exchange risk premium isjust a fair reward for theexchange risk they beaz. Consequentiy,
large exchange risk premia do not always mean that capital mobility is zero. Exchange risk that is not
priced hampers capital mobility.
(3) Deviations.from ex post UIP
A stronger criterion for money market integration is the UIP condition. With respect to the size of inean
deviations from ex post UIP [3J - measured as the positive or negative difference from zero in absolute9
value - we may list the countries in ascending order of estimated degree of UIP integration as follows:
Greece (calculated over the period September t984-August 1992), Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland,
Denmark, Belgium, Portugal, France and the Netherlands. With respect to the size of inean absolute
devia[ions from ex post UIP [ ~3 ~], we may list the countries in ascending order of estimated degree of
UIP integration as follows: United Kingdom, Spain, Pottugal, Greece (calculated (over the period September
1984-August 1992). Italy, Ireland, Denmark, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Clearly, Iarge outliers
may bias the result with respect to mean deviations from ex post UIP. Ontliers may be caused by large
nominat exchange rate variability. The money market of the United Kingdom is not very well integrated
with [he money market ofGermany according to the UIPcondition incontrastwiththe integration according
to the CIP condition. German investors who invest in the United Kingdom apparently demand an exchange
risk premium before they are willing to invest in the United Kingdom. Consequently, the additional
assumption required for UIP (i.e. zero exchange riskpremium) dilutes the inference from the UIP condition
on the degree of money market integration.
An important issue is the question what will happen with ex post UIP deviations if the EMS of fixed but
adjustable exchange rates changes into a system with irrevocably fixed exchange rates, that is, when we
have a monetary union. The Delors Report ( 1989, p. 10)outtines three necessary conditions for a monetary
union: ( I) the assurance oftotal and irreversible convertibility ofcurrencies; (2) the complete liberalisation
of capital [ransactions and full integration of banking and other financial markets; and (3) the elimination
of margins offluctuations and the irrevocable locking ofexchange rate parities. In the terminology oftable
I perfect monetary integration implies nominal interest parity. Perfect monetary integration may be seen
as a special case of UIP." If exchange rate parities are irrevocably fixed and fluctuation margins are
eliminated perfect monetary integration implies nominal interest rate parity:
.k - tr.r.k
(2')
Consequently, the expected exchange rate change equals the realised exchange rate change and is zero
by definition [(s,~~-s,)-E,(s„k-sJ-O]. That is, investors have perfectforesight. Subsequently, we may
decompose nominal interest parity as follows:
i,.,,k -i,,,.k -[ir.r.k -ir.r.t -(fr .e -sr)] `[U,r~k -s,) - Er(sr.k -sr)1 ' [E,(s,.R -sr)] (3')
However, as table 2 indicates exchange risk premia are far from zero. Fixed nominal exchange rates are
not (yet) feasible.
" Van Gemert and Gruijters (1994, p. 10-1 I) call monetary integration perfect ifcapital convols have been abolished andmarket
participants no longer expect the bilateral exchange rate to change at all. Observe - as was noted by Van Gemertand Gruijters -
the subtle difference between perfect capital rnobiliry of rype [I and perfect monetary integration. With perfect capital mobiliry
oftype II the ezchange risk premiumdropsoutbecauseinvestors are assumedW berisk-neutral. With perfect monetary integration
the exchange risk premium drops out because exchange rate expectations are held with certainty.lo
(4) Deviatiotts from ex post PPP
Ex post PPP holds if the ex post real exchange rate between two countries remains constant. This means
that the domestic currency depreciates at a rate equal to the ex post inFlation differential. It also means
that in the absence of relative price changes the nominal exchange rate change equals the real exchange
rate change. With respect to the size of inean deviations from ex post PPP [4] - measured as the positive
or negative difference from zero in absolute value - we may list the countries in ascending order as follows:
France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece (calculated over the period September 1984-August
1992), Spain, Portugal, Ireland, United Kingdom and Italy. With respect to the size of inean absolute
deviations from ex post PPP [ ~ 4~], we may list the countries inascending order as follows: the Netherlands,
Belgium, France, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Greece (calculated over the periud September 1984-August
1992), Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Again, outliers may bias the result with respect to mean
ex post PPP deviations. Moreover, ontliers may not only be caused by large nominal exchange raze variability
but by large inFlation rate variability as well. Ex post PPP generally fails as is indicated by mean absolute
deviations from ex post PPP.
(5) Ex post currency premia
It isexpected that financial markets translate monetary uncertainties intohigher currency premia, consisting
ofexchange riskpremia and deviations from PPP. With respect to the size of inean ex postcurrency premia
[Sj - measured as the positive or negative difference from zero in absolute value - we may list the countries
in ascending order as follows: Greece (calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992), the
Netherlands, United Kingdom, lreland, France, Italy, Dettmark, Belgium, Portugaland Spain. With respect
to the size ofinean absolute ex post currency premia [ ~5 ~], we may list the countries in ascending order
as follows: the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, ltaly, Spain, Portugal
andGreece (calculated overtheperiod September 1984-August 1992). Notice the differencein the ascending
orders.
(6) Deviatiortsfran ex post RIP
The RIP condition is the strongest criterion for money market integration. However, the RIP condition
not only measures short-term financial integration but short-term non-financial integration as well. "' With
respect to the size ofinean deviations from ex post RIP [6] - measured as the positive or negativedifference
from zero in absolute value - we may list the countries in ascending order of estimated degree of RIP
integrationas follows: Portugal, Greece (calculatedover theperiodSeptember 1984-August 1992), Belgium,
Denmark, Spain, Ireland, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy and France. With respect to the size
ofinean absolute deviations from ex postRIP [ ~ 6 ~], we may list the countries inascending orderofestimated
degree of RIP integration as follows: Greece (calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992),
"' t3ecause nun-financirl i~ucgration is typically perceiveJ to uke place over a longer time horizun, it might bebetter touse yearly
Jata rdther than monthly Jau to a~cess the degree or non-financial inlegralion.11
Portugal, Spain, Ireland, United Kingdom, Denmark, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and France. Table
2 shows that currency factors (i.e. curcency premia) dominate country factors (i.e. country premia) in
explaining real interest rate differentials with respect to Germany on the basis of inean absolutedeviations.
Mean absolute deviations from ex post R[P do not differ as much between European countries as mean
absolutedeviations from ex post UIPbecause EMScountrieswith relatively high inFlation rates also maintain
relatively high short-term nominal interest rates.
4 The speed of money market integration in Europe
In table 2 we assessed the degree of money marketintegration by calculating the size and variability of
mean (absolute) deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post RIP over the period March 1979-August
1992. It may also be worthwhile to examine the speed ofmoney market integration. We examine the speed
of money market integration by regressing absolute deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post RIP
over the period March 1979-August 1992 against a constant (aiefficient p„) and a time trend (ccefficient
,Bi) (cf. Frankel, 1990, p. 22 and Frankel, Phillips and Chinn, 1993, pp. 274-275):
Y, -~o t~ i't t e,
(8)
Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates and corresponding Newey-West standard errors of equation (8).
The size ofthe trend coefficient (3i captures the speed ofintegration. Or in other words, the trend coefficient
Q, captures the margina[change in the degree of money market integration. The more negative the trend
ccefficient the larger the downward trend in absolute deviations from CIP, ex post UIP or ex post RIP
and the larger the speed of integration. For example, the monthly decline of absolute CIP differentials
amounts to 0.013 per cent per year over the period March 1979-August 1992. We catl this the catching
up with respect to CIP.12
Table 3- Time trends in mean absolute deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post RIP over the
period March 1979-August 1992 (in percentages per year)~~
( Ordinary Leart Squares esrimation of y r-~ o.(i ~. f. e r)
Cnnstant Trend R~
Belgium CIP 1.793 (0.381)" -0.013 (0.003)" 0.22
UIP 6.048 (1.421)" -0.033 (0.011)" 0.09
RIP 3.406 (0.435)" -0.012 (0.004)" 0.08
Ucnmark CIP 2.7G0 (0,22(q" -0.020 (0.002)" 0.45
UIP 8.006 (0.854)" -0.039 (0.008)" 0.25
RIP 3.959 (0.466)" -0.010 (0.005)' 0.03
France CIP 4.082 (0.761)" -0.028 (0.006)" 0.23
UIP 5.721 (1.162)" -0.018 (O.OIO) 0.03
R(P 3.280 (0.509)" -0.0t2 (0.005)' 0.09
Greece' CIP 7.648 (0.947)" -0.052 (0.013)" 0.17
UIP 15.522 (5.856)" -0.142 (0.083) 0.09
RIP 6.720 (1.240)" -0.011 (0.018) -0.OI
Ireland CIP 1.496 (0.162)" -0.009 (0.001)" 0.26
IJIP 7.403 (1.055)" -0.032 (0.009)" 0.08
RIP 4.667 (0.791)" -0.017 (0.007)' 0.09
Italy CIP 4.628 (0.771)" -0.035 (0.007)" 0.33
UIP 7.747 (0.814)" -0.024 (0.008)" 0.07
RIP 4.885 (0.946)" -0.024 (0.009)" 0.15
The Netherlands CIP 0.938 (0.(25)" -0.007 (0.001)" 0.35
UIP 4.175 (0.495)'" -0.027 (0.004)" 0.33
RIP 2.467 (0.314)" -0.001 (0.004) -0.06
Pnrtugal CIP 9.335 (1.832)" -0.047 (0.014)" 0.12
UIP 12.599 (2.292)" -0.038 (0.020) 0.03
RIP 8.051 (1.092)" -0.035 (0.010)" 0.15
Spain CIP 6.075 (0.722)" -0.043 (0.006)" 0.42
UIP 13.961 (2.191)" -0.046 (0.02I)' 0.05
RIP 3.599 (0.483)" -0.002 (0.005) -0.Ol
United Kingdnm CIP 1.100 (0.122)" -0.006 (0.001)" 0.15
UIP 22.527 (2.39t)" -0.095 (0.021)" 0.12
RIP 3.708 (0.763)" -0.OOS (0.007) 0.00
' Calculated over the perind September 1984-August 1992.
' CcetFicient diflérs significantly frnm zero at the 95 96 level of confulence ([wo-tailed tesQ
" Cnefficient diftèrs sígnificantly from zero at the 99 96 level of cnnfiderce (twn-tailed test)
Newey-West sWndard erron are indicated in parentheses.
Source: see appendiac A.
" Non-lineer specifcarums which ovcrcome the problem tbat absnlutedeviations may hecome negativeas time increases ( IY~ ~ c
0 if t~ oo) generally did mx perfnrm beaer in terms of Rr and level of significance than the linear specification. We estimated




Funhermore, al.ur lhe follnwing spccific;aticros did not perform bettur than thc linear specificatNro (where Iy,I G 0 if t y m):
y, - pa t pt . f~ e,
Y(-~ n' p ~' r 2' e r13
The picture of estimated speed of integration in Europe is as follows. All ten European countries show
significant negative trend coefficients with respect to absolute deviations from CIP at either 95 ~ or 99
`~ level uf confidence. The same holds for the negative trend ccefficient of absolute deviations from ex
post UIP except for France, Portugal and Greece (calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992).
The mon[hly change in the absolute deviation from ex post RIP is sígnificantly negative at either 95 ~
ur 99 k, Icvcl nf cnnfidence for Belgium, Uenmark, I~rance, Ireland, Italy anJ Portugal. Notice that the
speed of UIP integration is generally larger than the speed of CIP and RIP integration.
Wilh respect to absolute deviations from CIP, we may list the countries in a.ccending order of estimated
speed of CIP integration: United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy,
Spain, Portugal and Greece (calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992). The relatively low
speed uf CIP integration of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom may be explained by the already
high degree of CIP integration in the beginning of the sample period. Spain, Portugal and Greece had
a lot to catch up with respect to the reference country Germany in terms of CIP integration. With respect
to absolute deviations from UIP we may list the countries in ascending order of estimated speed of UIP
integration as follows: France, Italy, the Netherlands, [reland, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark, Spain, the
United Kingdom and Greece (calculated over the periud September 19R4-August 1992). With respect to
absolute deviations from RIP we may list the countries in ascending order uf estimated speed of RIP
integration as follows: the Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece (calculated over the
period September 1984-August 1992), Belgium, France, Ireland, [taly and Portugal.
5 The trade-off between degree and the speed of money market integration in Europe
This section combines the two previous sections on the degree and the speed of money market integration
in Europe. We may infer the degree of money market integration from table 2 and the speed of money
market integration from table 3. Consequently, we may wishto look for the existence of a trade-off between
the degree and the speed of money market integration. The trade-off may be motivated by the wish to
form an Economic and Monetary Union in Europe.
Figure I illustrates the trade-off between the degree and the speed of CIP, UIP and RIP integration in
Europe over the period March 1979-August 1992. Greece is excluded from figure I because of the lack
of comparability uf the sample period. The speed of integration is graphed un the vertical axis and the
degree of integration is graphed on the horizontalaxis. The degree of integration is measured as ccefficient
(3o in the regression of inean absolute deviations against a constant term (see section 3). The speed of
integratiun is measured as ccefficient S~ in the regression of inean absolute deviations against a constant
and a time trend (see section 4). The degree of integrationdeclines ifthe ccefficient values on the horizontal14
axis increase. The speed of integration increases if the coefficient values on the vertical azis become more
negative. There ezists a negative trade-off between the degree and the speed of integration. That is, the
higher the speed of integration, the lower the degree of integration and vice versa. The lower the degree
of integration in the beginning ofthe sample period the higher the speed ofintegration over the rerttainder
of the sample period and vice versa.
Figure 1- The trade-off between the degree and thespeed otCIP, UIP and RIPintegratlon in Europe
over the period Marcó 1979-August 1992 (exdudiug Greece)
( Degrec of integration mtasured as coe,~ïcitnt ~ o o.f : I Y, I-~ o' e,)
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Taking the size of absolute deviations from C[P into account the graph for the CIP trade-off shows that
countries like France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece statting from a lower degree of CIP integration
in the beginning ofthe sample pericxl rapidly eliminated capital controls during the remainder of the sample
period. The United Kingdom and the Netherlards already showed small absolute deviations from C1P in
the beginning of the sample period. Consequently, the speed of CIP integration - or in other words the
catching up with respect to CIP integration - for those countries is low. The catching up with respect to
UIP for Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom is large. The catching up wi[h respect to RIP is particularly
large for Portugal.
Table 4 assesses the strength of the CIP, UIP and RIP trade-off by regressing the speed of integratiun
against a constant term and the degree ofintegration." The larger the R2 and the more negative ccefficient
~, the stronger the trade-off.
Table 4- The strength the trade-otF between the degree and the speed of integration over the period
March 1979-Augast 1992 (excludittg Greece)'
( Ordinary Least Squares cstrmatron of Speed - ~l o t.l ~ ~ Degree t v r)
Speed of integration Constanl Degree of integratiem Durbin-WaLSOn
sWtistic
R~
CIP -O.IxIR (0.004)' -0.()[19 (0.0(12)'" 2.45 0.71
UIP -0.008 (0.006) -0.005 (0.001)" 2.60 0.69
RIP 0.010 (0.012) -0.007 (O.b04) 2.16 0.25
' Greece is excluded fmm Ihe sample for companbility.
' Coef7kienc diffen significantly fmm zero at the 95 R, level of confidence (two tailed tesq
" Coefficient difïers significantly fmm zero at the 99 96 level of confdence (two taikd tesQ
OLS standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
Theresults indicateasignificantnegativeCIPandUIPtrade-off. The CIP trade-off- therelationshipbetween
the degree and the speed of CIP integration - is strongest. The directive of 24 June 1988, which is part
of the Single Market project, when the European Cornmission stated that as from I July 1990 all short-term
and long-term capital movements in Europe are to be free of restrictions has certainly enhanced the CIP
trade-off. However, the UIP trade-off is weaker as may beexplainedby theexistence ofpersistent exchange
risk premia. The RIP trade-off is only border-line significant at the 95 96 level of confidence. The stringent
assumptions required for RIP undoubtedly have contributed to this result. The weak RIP trade-off may
be explained by the Single Market project to complete an internal market for persons, goods, services
" N~nc that thc results in table 4 nray fx dependent on the ~wtlkrs which show up in figure I, i.e. Ponugal for CIP and RIP
anJ the United Kingdom for UIR Pur the sake of comparability and the already few observatxms u.ced in the regressNins no
further nbservalions are omitted.17
and capital in Europe by the end of 1992 (or later). Gctods market integration lags financial market
integration. Since RIP assumes that PPP holds continuously the RIP trade-off is at best seen as a long-rwr
relationship between the degree and the speed of RIP integration.
6 Conclusions
This paper documents on the available evidence ofmoney market integration in Europe. We analysed three
interest parity conditions measuring different types of perfect capital mobility. We conclude that there
exists a strong negative trade-off between the degree and thespeed of CiP integration in Europe. The initial
low degree of CIP integration urged countries like France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece to catch up
with the other European coun[ries. The trade~ff between the degree and the speed of UIP atd RIP-integration
is less strong. Still, also the UIP trade-off is well established. Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom
with an initial low degree of UIP integration definitely showed larger speeds of UIP integration.
Increased exchange rate instabilityafterthe EMS exchangecrisisofSeptember 1992will probablyadversely
affect the UIP trade-off since mean (absolute} deviations from ex post CIP are more stable than mean
(absolute)deviation from U[P. Unfortunately, the efforts followingthe EMS crisis to defend the exchange
rates within pre-specified bands by manipulation of nominal money market interest rates and exchange
market intervention lacked credibility. Consequently, on August 1 1993, ERM bands were widened to
t IS 4b except for the band between the Netherlands and Germany which remained unchanged at f 2.25
~,. All currencies, except the Dutch Guilder, are effectively freely Floating against the DM.is
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Appendix B
This appendix explains the calculation of Newey-West (1987) standard errors. In order to be able to use
regression analysis in case of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the error term e„ the variance
covariance matrix of the ordinary least squares estimator is defined as follows:
Vn~Y w~a -(T-K)-' (E~ i xrr~~)-' Ei -k w~ E~~ êf~~i Xrt~-i (E~ ~ zri~~)-~
Bartiett weights w, are defined as follows:
w~-1 -~-
kil
The Bartiett weights w, ensure that the middlepart of the above equation is positivedefinite in finite samples.
The use of such a set ofweights is clearly compatible with the idea that the impact of the autocovariances
diminishes with lag length ~ l ~. Standard errors that are computed in this way are known as Newey-West
(1987) standard errors. With only a cotvstant term Sa, x, is simply the unit vector and we have T-1 degrees
of freedom (K - I). The middle part allows for autocorrelation up to lag length ~ I~ ., The errors e, and e„
are correlated jE(e,e„) aEO~ if ~ 1~ G 3 and uncorrelated [E(e,e,-,)-0] if ~ l~ ?3. Because the autocovariances
are zero for lag lengths larger than three ~l ~? 3, we choose ~ l~-3 as the maximum lag length. The choice
of ~l ~ is a reflection of how far back in time one must go to consider the autocorrelation negligible.20
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